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Abstract. Some formulations of the surprise paradox involve a pair of unnecessary and 
controversial assumptions. After casting doubt on these assumptions, I propose a solution to the 
paradox. 
 
 In this paper, I identify and call into question a pair of assumptions that appear in some 
formulations of the surprise exam paradox. Most formulations of the paradox begin along the 
following lines. A teacher makes an announcement to their students that there will be a surprise 
exam in the next school week. Let us suppose that the school week lasts from Monday to Friday. 
The students reason that the exam will not happen on Friday because it will not be a surprise on 
that day. The night before, they would be able to predict that the exam will happen on Friday. But 
given that it will not happen on Friday, the students rule out the previous day as well. On the night 
before, they would be able to predict that the exam will happen on this day, since it will not happen 
on Friday. By extending this way of reasoning, they rule out all of the other days in the next school 
week. The students’ conclusion is that a surprise exam cannot happen. 
There is nothing wrong with this way of introducing the students’ argument. But quite a 
few formulations of the surprise exam paradox end in a way captured by the quotation below, 
which I have taken from mathematician Timothy Chow: 
Confident in this conclusion, they are of course totally surprised when the exam 
occurs (on Wednesday, say). The announcement is vindicated after all. Where did 




Here Chow makes the following assumptions. First, if the teacher’s students are surprised by the 
exam, then the teacher has succeeded in giving a surprise exam. Second, if the teacher’s students 
are surprised by the exam, having accepted their argument against the possibility of a surprise 
exam, then there is a problem with this argument. Other statements of the surprise exam paradox 
which end as Chow’s does also make the same assumptions (e.g. Butler and Chapman 1965: 424; 
Sorensen 1986: 337; Goldstein 1993: 93; Hall 1999: 647-648; Gerbrandy 2007: 21-22). These 
assumptions may seem beyond doubt, but in fact it is doubtful that they should be made. 
 In order to look into the students’ argument in more detail, it is a good idea to interpret it so 
that it relies on a definition of when the exam would be a surprise. But which definition should we 
work with? In everyday life, it makes sense to say that the teacher has surprised their students if the 
exam happens on a day that the students have not predicted beforehand, which is why the 
assumptions above seem beyond doubt. But when discussing the surprise exam paradox, we do not 
wish to say that the teacher succeeded if the students have failed to predict the day of the exam but 
it was still possible to predict it by deduction. For then the teacher has simply got lucky. They are 
lucky that they did not have a student who made the deduction. 
Given the consideration above, it makes sense to interpret the students’ argument so that 
they are relying on the following definition: the teacher has successfully given a surprise exam if it 
is impossible for there to be a student in their class who, working only from the officially available 
information, deduces that the exam will happen on that day. As the term ‘deduce’ is being used 
here, to deduce from the officially available information means to reason validly from it. Officially 




said in their announcement that there will be a surprise exam
1
 and whether the exam has been 
given yet or not. I do not think there is anything else that needs to be added to this list here. 
 Now if we interpret the students as relying on this definition, then they can respond to 
Chow’s statement of the paradox as follows: “Although we did not believe that the exam would 
occur on Wednesday, and hence were surprised, there could have been a student who only had 
access to the officially available information yet who deduced that the exam would happen on this 
day. As we said in our argument, on Tuesday night a student could rule out the later days until only 
this day was left. The teacher therefore surprised his students by luck, the luck of having no such 
student. So the teacher has not set a genuine surprise exam, because a genuine surprise exam 
should be impossible to deduce beforehand from the officially available information.” In a real life 
situation, this response is likely to provoke mockery, because the students ended up surprised. But 
when philosophers or mathematicians discuss the surprise exam paradox, this response matters. 
Philosophers and mathematicians are usually interested in a surprise exam that can survive 
changes in the student body, to include a student who thinks differently. 
 The student response I have presented reveals that the two assumptions that were identified 
towards the beginning of this paper are open to doubt. Recall those assumptions: if the teacher’s 
students are surprised by the exam, then the teacher has succeeded in giving a surprise exam; and if 
the teacher’s students are surprised by the exam, having accepted their argument against the 
possibility of a surprise exam, then there is a problem with this argument. I do not think that the 
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 This may sound circular because the term ‘surprise exam’ appears in the teacher’s announcement. To avoid 
circularity, the teacher can be interpreted as saying, “There will be an exam on one of the school days next week. 
Before the exam occurs, it will not be possible for you to deduce the day of the exam by working from the officially 
available information. The officially available information covers: this announcement of mine, anything else I say to 




surprise exam paradox should be initially formulated so that the students’ surprise is used against 
them, because that involves making these questionable assumptions. 
 
A solution. In the response from the students that I have presented, they appeal to a 
hypothetical student. The exam happens on Wednesday and on Tuesday night there supposedly 
could be a student who deduces this. I shall dispute the consistency of this hypothetical student’s 
beliefs. On Tuesday night, the student reasons that the exam cannot happen on the days after 
Wednesday, which means only Wednesday is left, so the exam will happen on this day. However, 
what is their reason for ruling out the later days? For example, if the end of the school week is 
Friday, what is their reason for ruling out Friday? Their reason is that there could be a student who 
comes to school on that day having deduced that the exam will occur on that day and, if that is the 
case, the exam will not occur on that day, because it will not be a surprise. They rule out Thursday 
for the same reason. But how then can it be consistent for them to believe that the exam will 
happen on Wednesday? 
Their ruling-out principle is this: the exam will not happen on day X if there could be a 
student who goes to school on that day having deduced that the exam will occur on that day, 
working only from the officially available information. Now do they not take themselves to be 
such a student on Wednesday? Do they not take themselves to be a student who goes to school on 
Wednesday having deduced that the exam will occur on that day? If so, then it is inconsistent for 
them to not rule out Wednesday as well, given their ruling-out principle. The hypothetical student 
cannot consistently believe that the exam will happen on Wednesday.
2
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 What though about the case of a student who thinks as follows: (a) they believe that the exam will happen on 
Wednesday, having reasoned in the way presented; (b) strangely they do not believe that they are a student who has 
deduced this by relying only on the officially available information? It is only such a student who can consistently 
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to defend the students’ argument by appealing only to this peculiar case. We are interested in whether there can be a 
student who deduces the day of the exam by relying only on official information while believing that this is what 
they have done. There are no students who can do this consistently. 
